As it moved into position around Bardia in late December 1940, the 6th Australian Division was still experiencing shortages.
It had only two of its three artillery regiments and only the 2/1st Field Regiment was equipped with the new 25-pdr, which it had received only that month. The 2/2nd Field Regiment was still equipped with twelve 18-pdr and twelve 4.5-inch howitzers.
To make up for this, O'Connor augmented Brigadier Edmund Herring's 6th Australian Division Artillery with part of the XIII Corps artillery:
[Source : Wikipedia]
At a range ol 400 yards the guns of A/E Battery, 3rd Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery, engaged German tanks forming the defences ol Tobruk. The continuous shooting set tanks on fire and allegedly blew the turrets off. The openness of desert warfare meant that guns and tanks were often pitted directly against one another. What is more, it meant that the 25-pounder was also engaged frequently against the 88 mm flak guns.
Often, the 25-pounder was used in desparation against tanks.
On 21 January 1942, forty enemy tanks, mostly Panzer IIls and Panzer IVs, attacked Baron column from about 4,000 yards. After a five-hour battle, it was decided to conduct a fighting withdrawal whilst being attacked by Stuka dive-bombers and the advancing armoured units. During this action, C and D troops of A Battery were firing over open sights at the enemy. Three guns were destroved and although two guns continued firing, reports suggest that they only did real damage by indirect fire at ranges over 600 yards.
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According to reports front November 1942, indirect fire on tank formations was considered to be far more effective. If enemy tanks in numbers were seen by an observation post, a concentration of fire was brought down upon them. It was difficult to judge the effect of this fire because it was obscured by dust and heat waves.
In one case, a regimental concentration fired on some 30 enemy tanks with the result, it is alleged, that 5 were set on fire, a few others were stopped and the rest withdrew. The main conclusion was that the concentration of a regiment of guns on tank groups invariably led to withdrawal of the tanks.
Firing direct in its secondary role a troop of 25-pounders can knock out tanks at short ranges, but as an A/tk weapon a 25-pdr is far inferior to the 6-pdr.
A high-explosive shells would normally only destroy or immobilise a tank if it hit a track or the top of the turret. There are many examples of the 25-pounder being used as a short-range weapon against tanks, but it was the ease with which the gun could be trained on a target that meant it was more suitable than other field guns for this use.
Over one and a half million rounds were expended. The only limitations on the guns were how quickly the ammunition could be brought up. The average expenditure of rounds per gun was 102 per day over 12 days.
The attack of the 2nd New Zealand Division on the night of the 1/2 November was accompanied by a barrage of 25-pounder guns that was able to give a concentration of one gun per 21 yards of barrage frontage. The average rate of fire was 2 rounds per gun per minute.
For the man on the ground, El Alamein was a time of great activity. Gunners were involved in firing at night, constantly firing and being resupplied by trucks from the Canal Zone area.